Through the years, the recording industry has battled peer-to-peer networking companies, the results of which were successful in some cases, and unsuccessful in others. The RIAA was able to successfully shut down Napster. However, the RIAA was not able to accomplish the same with other services, such as Kazaa, Morpheus, and Grokster. In fact, the RIAA was actually counter sued by Kazaa developer Sharman Networks in an antitrust claims suit in January 2003. Sharman Networks claimed music labels and studios conspired to keep authorized and copy-protected versions of their songs off Kazaa, and blamed piracy on the entertainment companies, saying they failed to work with Sharman to create a legal alternative (Associated Press, 2003a). But a federal judge ruled the company could not pursue an antitrust lawsuit against major recording labels (Associated Press, 2003a).
In April 2003, a federal judge in Los Angeles rejected an effort led by the RIAA to shut down file sharing services Grokster and Morpheus, ruling instead the industry should pursue the individual users of those services (MacMillan, 2003). This served as a setback in the RIAA’s battle against piracy, as it would eventually do just what the federal judge suggested. Later in 2003, after repeated warnings, cease and desist letters, instant messaging tools, and many other resources, the RIAA began to use a new tactic of going directly after individual users instead of trying to attack the technology (Ahrens, 2003).
The first individuals to face charges were four students from three different universities. Daniel Peng, a sophomore from Princeton University, Joe Nievelt, a junior from Michigan Technological University, and Jesse Jordan and Aaron Sherman from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute were all sued by the recording industry. The RIAA would try to make an example of these four students to show others how seriously they meant to pursue those who were committing online music piracy (Knopper, 2003, p. 23). Each of the four defendants ran local area networks (LAN) in the computer systems of their universities which were used to tie together several computers and make the contents of each computer's hard drive available to other users on the network. The RIAA said the four defendants each ran search engines which enabled users to find and download songs illegally (Ahrens, 2003; Holland 2003b, p. 8).
The RIAA asked federal judges to shut down the students' file sharing services and award them cash damages, which under copyright law could amount to as much as $150,000 per song. The RIAA claimed the sites offered 27,000 to 1 million songs each, which were available for students to download for free (Ahrens, 2003; Holland 2003b, p. 8). In the end, none of the students admitted guilt or wrongdoing, but agreed not to knowingly infringe on song copyrights in the future and to take down their file sharing networks, in addition to making monetary settlements. Jesse Jordan settled for $12,000, Daniel Peng and Joseph Nievelt each settled for $15,000, and Aaron Sherman settled for $17,500 (Ahrens, 2003; Carlson, 2003a, p. A34; Collins, 2003; Holland, 2003b, p. 8).
After the cases were settled, Howard S. Ende, the lawyer for Daniel Peng said "It's very unfortunate that the recording industry, in trying to protect their profits, has used the legal system to intimidate students who are often their best customers. Rather, the industry should be working with colleges and universities to resolve its economic problems created by the development of new technologies" (Ahrens, 2003). Some individuals shared his sentiments, while others praised the court’s results and findings.
The approach of suing individuals would not stop there, and the suits began to gain even more momentum after a U.S. District Court judge in Washington, D.C., ruled Verizon had to give the RIAA the names of two high-speed Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) customers allegedly involved in rampant illegal sharing of copyrighted music. The Verizon ruling helped pave the way for the RIAA to use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to acquire personal information about individuals by providing their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The RIAA was using provisions of the DMCA to force Internet service providers (ISP) and colleges and universities to provide this information to them.
After the Verizon ruling, the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against suspected individual Internet music file sharers in September 2003 (Legon, 2003). They also announced the “Clean Slate Program,” which grants amnesty to users who voluntarily identify themselves, erase downloaded music files and promise not to share music ever again on the Internet (Legon, 2003). The RIAA subpoenas snared unsuspecting grandparents whose grandchildren had used their personal computers, individuals whose roommates had shared their computers, as well as colleges and universities across the United States (Carlson, 2003b, p. A34). After the lawsuits from the RIAA’s round of subpoenas were filed, even a 12 year-old girl had been sued.
The suits continued and the recording industry had received total cooperation from Internet service providers, until Boston College, Boston University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) refused to provide names, citing the subpoenas were illegal because they weren't filed properly, and didn’t allow for adequate time to notify the students, as mandated by the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (Collins, 2003; Foster, 2003; Lindsay, 2003). However, this was not a move by these colleges to protect their students, as they said they would comply with the order if the subpoenas were filed properly.
The large number of subpoenas began to force colleges and university administrators to take note, and to devote orientation time educating students about copyright infringement, as well as informing concerned parents about file sharing and piracy (Collins, 2003). Some universities, such as Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, placed an emphasis on education, and required every freshman attend an orientation seminar on copyright infringement before receiving access to a high-speed Internet connection (Black, 2002). Other colleges, such as Boston College and DePaul University, informed incoming freshmen during orientation they would not protect students if the recording industry were to catch them sharing copyrighted music files (Collins, 2003).
The RIAA would send out a round of 80 subpoenas to individuals in October 2003 (Bridis, 2003b) and then another round of 41 subpoenas in December 2003 (Associated Press, 2003b). This brought the RIAA’s subpoena count to 382 lawsuits in four months. Not to be outdone, peer-to-peer file sharing service Kazaa began fighting back against the RIAA. Two derivatives of the popular Kazaa peer-to-peer file sharing service actively attempted to block scans by the RIAA and other agencies, escalating the peer-to-peer networking war to a new level (Hachman, 2003).
A major issue which arises when considering the rights provided by the DMCA, which allow the copyright holders to subpoena personal information, is the right to privacy of the individuals versus the right of copyright holders to prevent piracy. While the RIAA suggests no one should have the right to violate copyrights anonymously (Rosen, 2003), others believe personal information should not be attainable through provisions of the DMCA, without having to go before a judge to plead the copyright holder’s case or show any proof of infringement (McGuire, 2003b).
In a ruling on December 19, 2003, t he U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned a trial judge's decision to enforce copyright subpoenas, which served as one of the most effective tools used by the recording industry (Bridis, 2003a; Rainie, Madden, Hess, & Mudd, 2003) . The ruling, however, did not legalize distributing copyrighted songs over the Internet, but greatly increased the cost and effort for the RIAA to track and sue individuals whom they believe are guilty of sharing copyrighted music online (Bridis, 2003a). “As the courts make it harder for record companies to track music piracy and file sharing companies develop technology to mask their users' identities, file-swappers will come back in angry droves” (McGuire, 2004a). After the ruling the RIAA vowed to continue its fight against individual file sharers whom it believes engages in infringement of copyrighted music online.
On January 21, 2004 the RIAA made good on its promise, as it brought suits against 532 individual file sharers whom it believed were guilty of committing online music piracy (Bridis, 2004a; McGuire, 2004b). The lawsuits were filed in New York City and Washington D.C., against defendants known only as "John Doe," and identified only by their computer’s IP addresses (Bridis, 2004; Holland, 2004, p. 5; McGuire, 2004b). The suits filed by the RIAA name "egregious" file-sharers, whose computers host more than 800 files which are accessible for other peer-to-peer networking users to download (Roberts, 2004). The lawyers for the RIAA were forced to work their way through the court system and provide evidence of copyright infringement in order to obtain the names and locations of the John Doe defendants. Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA stated in a telephone conference, "The message to illegal file sharers should be as clear as ever: we can and will continue to file lawsuits" (McGuire, 2004b).
The RIAA did remain relentless in its efforts to combat online music piracy as it continued to file lawsuits against individual users. But in March 2004, the recording industry’s John Doe lawsuits were dealt another devastating blow, when a federal judge ruled the RIAA could not use a single lawsuit to group mass quantities of suspected individuals together and sue them (Read, 2004a). The federal judge’s decision placed an obstacle in the recording industry’s way, in the form of higher legal fees due to the costs of additional subpoenas and lawyers. But once again this did not stop the recording industry’s efforts, as it continued to file more lawsuits against individuals suspected of engaging in illegal file sharing of copyrighted music.
On March 23, 2004 the RIAA began to target more suspected illegal file sharers at colleges and universities, as it sent out 532 subpoenas, of which 89 subpoenas were sent to 21 different colleges and universities. This group of subpoenas also marked the first time the RIAA made public the names of the colleges and universities it subpoenaed. In an interview, Cary Sherman stated, “We've always intended to address copyright infringers on university networks…These lawsuits are just part of a multipronged process to try to ensure that college students understand they're not immune from the consequences of illegal activity” (Read, 2004b). The colleges and universities named in the RIAA subpoenas were California at Berkeley, California State University at Northridge, Colorado at Colorado Springs, Drexel, George Mason, George Washington, Georgetown, Indiana University at Bloomington, Indianapolis, Loyola Marymount, Marquette, Maryland at College Park, Michigan at Ann Arbor, New York, Northern Colorado, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Vanderbilt, Villanova University, the University of Arizona, and the University of Southern California (Read, 2004b).
On April 28, 2004 the RIAA filed another 477 subpoenas against individuals suspected of illegal file sharing of copyrighted music, in which 69 subpoenas were served to 14 different colleges and universities. Again the RIAA made public the names of the colleges and universities which were subpoenaed. The colleges and universities named in these RIAA subpoenas were Brown, Emory, Georgia Institute of Technology, Gonzaga, Mansfield University of Pennsylvania, Michigan State, Princeton, Sacred Heart, Texas A&M University at College Station, Trinity College in Connecticut, Trinity University in Texas, Virginia Tech, the University of Kansas, and the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities (Read, 2004c).
The recording industry has remained persistent in its filing of subpoenas against individuals, and has vowed to continue lawsuits along with other tactics in order to protect its interests. But only time will tell how long the RIAA can continue filing lawsuits and, in its effort to stop online music piracy, whether it’s feasible to subpoena every single person who is suspected of engaging in the illegal file sharing of copyrighted music.